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CITIZENS UNITED AND THE ORPHANED 
ANTIDISTORTION RATIONALE 
Richard L. Hasen* 
INTRODUCTION 
Soon after his retirement, Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens 
gave an interview to the CBS television program 60 Minutes. 
Interviewer Scott Pelley asked the Justice to identify the Court’s 
“mistake” in Citizens United v. FEC,1 the 5–4 decision striking down 
corporate spending limits in candidate elections. When Justice 
Stevens, author of the primary Citizens United dissent,2 asked which 
mistake he should emphasize, Pelley told him to choose. Justice 
Stevens then responded:  
Well, you know, basically, an election is a debate. And most 
debates, you have rules. And I think Congress is the one that 
ought to make those rules. And if the debate is distorted by 
having one side have so much greater resources than the other, 
that, sometimes may distort the ability to decide the debate on 
the merits. You want to be sure that it’s a fair fight.3 
Reacting to the Stevens interview, David Bossie, the President of 
Citizens United, lauded the Court’s decision. He said that allowing 
corporations to spend their general treasury funds on elections (rather 
than being limited only to political action committee funds raised 
from human sources) “will allow the conservative movement to 
                                                                                                                 
 * Visiting Professor of Law, UC Irvine School of Law; William H. Hannon Distinguished 
Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. Thanks to Ellen Aprill and Bob Mutch for useful 
comments and suggestions. 
 1. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 2. Justice Thomas also wrote a dissent, for himself alone, on disclosure issues. Id. at 980 (Thomas, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 3. 60 Minutes: Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens Opens Up (CBS News television 
broadcast Nov. 28, 2010), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/11/23/ 
60minutes/main7082572.shtml?tag=contentMain;contentBody.  
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participate on a ‘level playing field’ with groups like MoveOn.org 
and labor unions.”4 
How strange that both the Citizens United prime dissenter and 
plaintiff described the decision in terms of its effect on political 
equality, an interest the Supreme Court in Citizens United termed the 
“antidistortion interest.”5 On 60 Minutes, Justice Stevens’s main 
complaint about the decision was that the unequal wealth of 
corporations could now distort electoral outcomes. In contrast, Mr. 
Bossie defended the decision on grounds that it will create greater 
equality across groups engaged in political battles.  
The irony in this debate over whether Citizens United promotes or 
impedes political equality is that Mr. Bossie’s group argued before 
the Supreme Court that the First Amendment barred taking political 
equality concerns into account in fashioning campaign finance rules.6 
In his dissent, Justice Stevens did his best to avoid acknowledging 
that he was defending corporate spending limits, in part, on political 
equality grounds. Justice Stevens’s failure to expressly defend 
corporate spending limits on political equality grounds came after the 
government had abandoned the rationale in the Supreme Court. 
This brief Essay argues that the antidistortion argument did not 
deserve to be orphaned, and remains—as the quotes by Justice 
Stevens and Mr. Bossie illustrate—a key animating principle in 
thinking about the desirability of campaign finance laws. Part I 
explains how the antidistortion argument became an orphan in 
Citizens United, laying the blame with the Solicitor General’s office 
and with Justice Stevens’s muddled Citizens United dissent. Part II 
                                                                                                                 
 4. Ryan J. Reilly, Citizens United President Enjoys ‘Bitching And Moaning’ Over Supreme Court 
Case, TPM MUCKRAKER (Dec. 1, 2010), http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/12/ 
citizens_united_president_enjoys_bitching_and_moan.php.  
 5. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903. Until the end of this Essay, I use the terms “antidistortion 
rationale” and “political equality rationale” interchangeably. At the end, I explain more fully the 
relationship between the two terms. 
 6. Supplemental Brief for Appellant at 1, Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 
(2009) (No. 08-205), available at http://electionlawblog.org/archives/Citizens%20United--
Supplemental%20Brief.pdf (“For the proper disposition of this case, the Court should reject the anti-
distortion rationale for suppressing corporate political speech formulated in Austin and relied upon in 
McConnell—which is the only justification the government has advanced for prohibiting Video On 
Demand distribution of Hillary.”). 
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explains the cost of this orphaning for the future of campaign finance 
and related laws: keeping the political equality rationale in the closet 
will make it harder to get legislative and judicial change in the 
campaign finance arena going forward, and it prevents a full and 
honest debate about the desirability and cost of campaign finance 
laws justified on political equality grounds.   
I.  HOW THE ANTIDISTORTION RATIONALE WAS ORPHANED7 
A.  From Austin to Citizens United 
Before Citizens United, the leading case on the constitutionality of 
corporate spending limits in candidate elections was Austin v. 
Michigan Chamber of Commerce.8 In that 1990 case, the Supreme 
Court upheld corporate spending limits in candidate elections against 
a First Amendment challenge. Austin did so based upon what the 
Supreme Court in Citizens United later termed9 the antidistortion 
interest: the government’s interest in curbing the “corrosive and 
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are 
accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little 
or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political 
ideas.”10 
Austin itself was somewhat of a surprise. Earlier, in the leading 
1976 case, Buckley v. Valeo,11 the Supreme Court, applying strict 
scrutiny, held that spending limits imposed on individuals violated 
the First Amendment.12 The Court concluded that individual 
spending limits could not be justified by an anticorruption interest 
because of the lack of evidence that independent spending could 
                                                                                                                 
 7. This Part assumes the reader is familiar with the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence 
generally and how the Citizens United decision changed that jurisprudence. For readers without that 
background, see generally Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. 
L. REV. 581 (2011). 
 8. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 9. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 903 (2010). 
 10. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660. 
 11. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 12. Id. at 20–21, 44–51. 
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corrupt candidates.13 Nor could the limits be justified on equality 
grounds, because doing so would be “wholly foreign” to the First 
Amendment.14  
Though Austin sought to characterize the antidistortion interest as a 
“different type of corruption in the political arena,”15 it fairly can be 
understood as voicing a type of political equality concern.16 That is, 
under Austin “corruption,” the way corporations “distort” the political 
process is not through quid pro quo corruption—“dollars for political 
favors”—or even “undue influence,” but rather through corporate 
spending that is disproportionate to the public’s support for the 
corporation’s political ideas. 
B.  The Citizens United Briefing and Argument: Abandonment 
Citizens United presented a delicate task for the Solicitor General’s 
office, the arm of the United States Department of Justice charged 
with defending the position of the United States before the Supreme 
Court. Though the Supreme Court in the 2003 case of McConnell v. 
FEC17 had reaffirmed Austin18 and extended it to labor unions, it was 
clear by the time the Court agreed to hear Citizens United that the 
Court had moved from its period of greatest deference toward 
legislative efforts at campaign finance regulation to its period of 
greatest skepticism.19 The cause of the shift was the replacement of 
                                                                                                                 
 13. Id. at 47. 
 14. Id. at 48–49. 
 15. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990). In First National Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti, the Supreme Court left open the question whether independent corporate spending 
could be justified on traditional anticorruption grounds. 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (1978). The Court did so 
despite Buckley’s statement that independent individual spending cannot corrupt because of the absence 
of coordination, and in Citizens United, the Court rejected the possibility of proving corruption by 
independent expenditures left open by Footnote 26 of Bellotti. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909. For 
further discussion of Footnote 26, see Hasen, supra note 7, at 596, 618. 
 16. This is a point I made in RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: 
JUDGING EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 114 (2003). In his concurring opinion in 
Citizens United, Chief Justice Roberts cited this work and others to support the proposition that Austin’s 
rationale was one grounded in political equality concerns. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 922 & n.2. 
 17. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 18. As with many points about Citizens United, this point about reaffirmation is controversial. See 
Hasen, supra note 7, at 599 (discussing dispute among Justices in Citizens United over whether Supreme 
Court had “reaffirmed” Austin in other cases).  
 19. See id. at 586–90. 
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retiring Justice O’Connor on the Court with Justice Alito, swinging a 
five-justice majority generally voting to uphold campaign finance 
regulation to a five-justice majority voting to strike such regulations 
down. Among the cases decided by this new majority was a 2008 
case, Davis v. FEC,20 in which five Justices on the Court 
emphatically rejected political equality as a permissible rationale for 
campaign finance regulation. 
In the initial Supreme Court briefing in Citizens United, the 
government certainly did not stress the antidistortion argument from 
Austin. But the government did not abandon the rationale either. In its 
original merits brief, the government wrote: 
Congress has historically imposed particularly stringent limits on 
the electoral advocacy of corporations and labor unions. Those 
restrictions reflect a legislative judgment that the special 
characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly 
careful regulation, and this Court has consistently respect[ed] 
that judgment. In particular, because of the numerous advantages 
that the corporate form confers, a corporation’s ability to pay for 
electoral advocacy has “little or no correlation to the public’s 
support for the corporation’s political ideas.”21  
The Supreme Court initially heard argument in Citizens United in 
March 2009,22 and the government’s case appeared to collapse when 
the Deputy Solicitor General had trouble answering a hypothetical 
question about the regulation of corporate-funded books containing 
the functional equivalent of express advocacy.23 At the end of 
Court’s term in June 2009, the Court announced it would rehear the 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 741 (2008). 
 21. Brief for the Appellee at 15, Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2009) 
(No. 08-205) (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. 205) (some citations and quotations omitted), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/08-205_Appellee.pdf . 
 22. Transcript of Oral Argument, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2009) (No. 08-205), 
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-205.pdf.  
 23. Adam Liptak, Justices Consider Interplay Between First Amendment and Campaign Finance 
Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2009, at A16. 
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case, and it asked for supplemental briefing on the following 
question:  
For the proper disposition of this case, should the Court overrule 
either or both Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 
U.S. 652 (1990), and the part of McConnell v. Federal Election 
Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), which addresses the facial validity 
of Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 
Section 441(b) in Title 2 of the United States Code?24 
The Solicitor General’s office had to decide how to handle the 
question of Austin’s vitality in the supplemental briefing. The issue 
was a high stakes one. Former Harvard Law School dean Elena 
Kagan had taken over as the Solicitor General, and she was set to 
argue this case, her first appellate argument in her career. She was 
widely rumored (correctly) to be on the short list for a Supreme Court 
opening. The Court’s supplemental briefing order called into question 
a key part of federal campaign finance law. People were going to be 
paying attention to this argument. 
The government had a number of reasons to downplay the 
antidistortion argument: it was sure to generate hostile questions from 
at least some Justices (who had dissented in Austin or who had shown 
skepticism to the constitutionality of regulation in recent cases); it 
was hard to see five votes to accept the argument, especially in light 
of Davis; as a law professor, Kagan had written an article calling 
Austin’s antidistortion argument into question;25 and spending time 
arguing over antidistortion would take time away at oral argument to 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Order Restoring Reargument, 128 S. Ct. 1732 (2009) (No. 08-205). Elsewhere I argue that under 
the constitutional avoidance doctrine the Court should not have asked for this supplemental briefing, or 
overruled Austin or part of McConnell in this case. See Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and 
Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 181. 
 25. Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First 
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 464-72 (1996). Before Kagan was confirmed as a 
Supreme Court Justice, I noted the difficulty in determining whether she would have voted with the 
majority or dissenters in Citizens United if she had been serving on the Supreme Court at that time. 
Richard L. Hasen, The Big Ban Theory, SLATE, May 24, 2010, http://www.slate.com/id/2254830/. 
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advance other, potentially more convincing arguments to sustain the 
corporate spending limits. 
In the supplemental brief,26 and at the second oral argument, the 
government did more than simply downplay the Austin antidistortion 
rationale: it abandoned it entirely. The government sought—without 
any apparent textual basis—to recast the antidistortion language in 
Austin as one about protecting shareholders from the political 
spending decisions of corporate managers.27 It also tried to defend 
corporate spending limits on more traditional anticorruption grounds. 
The brief made no mention of antidistortion as a political equality 
rationale or quoted the key Austin language. 
At the second Citizens United oral argument,28 when pressed by 
Chief Justice Roberts, General Kagan explicitly abandoned the 
antidistortion rationale: 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: . . . [P]utting the quid pro quo 
interest aside, where in your supplemental briefing do you 
support the interest that was articulated by the Court in Austin?  
 
GENERAL KAGAN: Where we talk about shareholder 
protection and where we talk about the distortion of the electoral 
process that occurs when corporations use their shareholders’ 
money who may or may not agree – 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I understand that to be a different 
interest. That is the shareholder protection interest as opposed to 
the fact that corporations have such wealth and they[] distort the 
marketplace.  
                                                                                                                 
 26. Supplemental Brief for the Appellee, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205), available at 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/08-205_us_supp.pdf.  
 27. Remarkably, the supplemental brief cites the pages containing the antidistortion language from 
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658–660 (1990), but the government never quotes 
that key language in the brief. Instead, the brief states, “[E]lectoral advocacy by for-profit corporations 
poses distinct risks, both to the public interest and to the corporation’s shareholders, that are not 
implicated by individual electioneering.” Supplemental Brief for the Appellee, supra note 26, at 6 
(citation omitted). 
 28. Transcript of Oral Argument, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-205%5BReargued%5D.pdf.  
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GENERAL KAGAN: Well, [I] I think that they are connected 
because both come - 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: [S]o am I right then in saying that 
in the supplemental briefing you do not rely at all on the market 
distortion rationale on which Austin relied; not the shareholder 
rationale, not the quid pro quo rationale, the market distortion 
issue. These corporations have a lot of money.  
 
GENERAL KAGAN: We do not rely at all on Austin to the 
extent that anybody takes Austin to be suggesting anything about 
the equalization of a speech market. So I know that that’s the 
way that many people understand the distortion rationale of 
Austin, and if that’s the way the Court understands i[t], we do not 
rely at all on that.29 
C.  The Muddled Treatment of the Antidistortion Rationale in Justice 
Stevens’s Dissent 
As one would expect, the Citizens United majority pounced on the 
government’s failure to defend the antidistortion interest. The Court 
wrote that the government “all but abandon[ed] reliance” on Austin’s 
antidistortion interest,30 and the Court then strongly rejected 
antidistortion as a permissible governmental interest.31 Chief Justice 
Roberts, in a concurring opinion dedicated to defending the 
overruling of Austin as unavoidable and the Court’s overruling of it 
in Citizens United as not activist,32 leaned heavily on the 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Id. at 47–48. Once General Kagan received a nomination to serve on the Supreme Court, 
newspapers considered whether the abandonment of Austin distortion was a strategic error. Adam 
Liptak, Stints in Court as the Window to a Style on It, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2010, at A1, available at 
2010 WLNR 7763123; see also Jess Bravin, Kagan and Key Case: Jury Still Out, WALL ST. J., May 12, 
2010, at A6; Adam Liptak, On First Amendment, Kagan Has Sympathized With Conservative Justices,  
N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2010, at A19, available at 2010 WLNR 10118063; Robert Barnes, In Elena 
Kagan’s Work as Solicitor General, Few Clues to Her Views, WASH. POST, May 13, 2010, available at 
2010 WLNR 9838059. 
 30. Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 903 (2009).  
 31. Id. at 904.  
 32. See Hasen, supra note 7, at 599–600 (describing Chief Justice Roberts’s concurring opinion). 
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government’s concession as well. At the end of a litany of reasons for 
rejecting the antidistortion rationale, the Chief wrote: “Finally and 
most importantly” was the government’s own failure to defend 
Austin’s rationale;33 “to the extent the Government relies on new 
arguments—and declines to defend Austin on its own terms—we may 
reasonably infer that it lacks confidence in that decision’s original 
justification.”34 
The task then fell to Justice Stevens to defend the antidistortion 
rationale, and in this task he fell short. In the midst of a very long 
dissent, Justice Stevens turned to the antidistortion rationale and 
offered a hodge-podge of inconsistent understandings of it. He began 
by denying any difference between the anticorruption and 
antidistortion rationales: “Understood properly, ‘antidistortion’ is 
simply a variant on the classic governmental interest in protecting 
against improper influences on officeholders that debilitate the 
democratic process. It is manifestly not just an ‘equalizing’ ideal in 
disguise.”35 Justice Stevens then argued that the antidistortion 
rationale should not be read as embracing an equality rationale,36 
though he acknowledged “that Austin can bear an egalitarian 
reading.”37  
Justice Stevens proceeded to discuss the differences between 
corporations and live human beings, noting, among other things, that 
corporations can be foreign-owned, have limited liability, perpetual 
life, and do not engage in self-expression the way human beings do:38 
“These basic points help explain why corporate electioneering is not 
only more likely to impair compelling governmental interests, but 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 923 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice explained that 
the Austin majority opinion relied upon neither the threat of quid pro quo corruption nor the need for 
shareholder protection. Id. 
 34. Id. at 924. 
 35. Id. at 970 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at 970 n.69 
(disagreeing with the Chief Justice that there is “nothing more to it” than equality). 
 36. Here, Justice Stevens relied upon that part of Austin quoted infra note 63. 
 37. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 970 n.69. 
 38. Id. at 970–72. 
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also why restrictions on that electioneering are less likely to encroach 
upon First Amendment freedoms.”39 
Justice Stevens then rejected the argument that the public’s interest 
in hearing a corporation’s ideas in the political marketplace justified 
First Amendment protection for corporate spending. Citing a long 
history of public concern about corporate interests dominating 
politics, Justice Stevens noted the political equality concerns behind 
Austin: large corporate spending could “marginalize[]” the opinions 
of “real people” by “drowning out non-corporate voices.”40 This in 
turn “can generate the impression that corporations dominate our 
democracy.”41 Significantly, throughout this discussion, Justice 
Stevens never acknowledged that these were political equality 
arguments.42 
Justice Stevens then discussed the potential for corporations to 
gain “special advantages in the market for legislation”43 through rent-
seeking:44 “Corporations . . . are uniquely equipped to seek laws that 
favor their owners, not simply because they have a lot of money but 
because of their legal and organizational structure. Remove all 
restrictions on their electioneering, and the door may be opened to a 
type of rent seeking that is far more destructive than what non-
corporations are capable of.”45 
In concluding the dissent’s section on the antidistortion interest, 
Justice Stevens returned to a concern about corporations drowning 
out other political ideas: “In the real world, we have seen, corporate 
                                                                                                                 
 39. Id. at 972. Justice Stevens also noted that corporations actually wanted limits on spending to 
prevent officeholders from “shak[ing] them down for supportive ads.” Id. at 973.  
 40. Id. at 974. 
 41. Id.; see also id. at 975–76 (“In the real world, we have seen, corporate domination of the 
airwaves prior to an election may decrease the average listener’s exposure to relevant viewpoints, and it 
may diminish citizens willingness and capacity to participate in the democratic process.”). 
 42. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143,147–48 
(2010) (“While Justice Stevens disputes the majority’s characterization of this interest as impermissibly 
advancing the ‘equalization’ of speaking power, his own description suggests that it is necessarily 
redistributive.” (footnote omitted)). 
 43. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 975. The dissent stated that corporations are “uniquely equipped” 
to engage in this “rent seeking.” Id. 
 44. For more on the rent-seeking rationale as used in Justice Stevens’ dissent, see generally Richard 
L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), draft 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1734428. 
 45. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 975 (quotations and citations omitted). 
10
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domination of the airwaves prior to an election may decrease the 
average listener's exposure to relevant viewpoints, and it may 
diminish citizens’ willingness and capacity to participate in the 
democratic process.”46 He stated that an exception for media 
corporations might be constitutionally required because of the unique 
information-providing role they play in society, but the exception for 
media corporations did not doom the constitutionality of corporate 
spending limits generally.47 
There are many provocative and important ideas in Justice 
Stevens’s dissent, but as a whole the antidistortion portion of the 
dissent does not cohere. Justice Stevens began by denying any 
difference between anticorruption and antidistortion arguments for 
limiting corporate spending, stating all the ideas are about improper 
influences on officeholders. He then turned to arguments that have 
nothing to do with quid pro quo corruption or undue influence 
(suggesting that his equation of anticorruption and antidistortion was 
incorrect): that corporations deserve less First Amendment protection 
than humans, that corporate spending can “drown out” the voices of 
non-corporate interests, that corporate spending can undermine voter 
confidence in our democracy, and that corporations can act in ways 
that undermine the efficiency of government. The second of these 
interests looks like the antidistortion rationale advanced in Austin, yet 
Justice Stevens denied he was making a political equality argument. 
The other three arguments are neither anticorruption nor 
antidistortion arguments. Whatever else may be said of this jumble, 
the dissent in its treatment of antidistortion did not offer a full-
throated, carefully crafted endorsement of the rationale. 
Oddly, Justice Stevens has offered political equality rationales for 
campaign finance laws in the past. For example, in Randall v. Sorrell, 
Justice Stevens speaking for himself alone argued in favor of the 
constitutionality of limits on candidate spending, based in part on a 
political equality rationale.48 Perhaps Justice Stevens in Citizens 
                                                                                                                 
 46. Id. at 975–76. 
 47. Id. at 976. 
 48. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 278 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Not only do [candidate 
spending] limits serve as an important complement to corruption-reducing contribution limits, but they 
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United was constrained in offering these arguments in order to keep 
the votes of other dissenters.49 Or perhaps Justice Stevens did not feel 
comfortable embracing the political equality rationale fully when the 
government chose to abandon it.50 Still, the fact that Justice Stevens 
chose to highlight the antidistortion interest in his 60 Minutes 
interview shows that the rationale remained important in his mind, 
months after he completed his lengthy opinion and service on the 
Court. 
II.  THE COSTS OF ORPHANING THE ANTIDISTORTION RATIONALE 
At first glance, the government’s abandonment of the antidistortion 
rationale and Justice Stevens’s distancing of himself from it seems 
inconsequential. The five-Justice majority would not have been 
swayed to decide the case differently had General Kagan or Justice 
Stevens wrapped themselves fully in the Austin antidistortion 
argument. As Kathleen Sullivan has explained,51 the Justices in the 
majority in Citizens United embrace a view of the First Amendment 
that is liberty-protecting rather than equality-enhancing, and the 
                                                                                                                 
also ‘protect equal access to the political arena, [and] free candidates and their staffs from the 
interminable burden of fundraising.’ These last two interests are particularly acute. When campaign 
costs are so high that only the rich have the reach to throw their hats into the ring, we fail ‘to protect the 
political process from undue influence of large aggregations of capital and to promote individual 
responsibility for democratic government.’ States have recognized this problem, but Buckley’s perceived 
ban on expenditure limits severely limits their options in dealing with it.” (citations and footnote 
omitted)); see also Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 518 U.S. 
604, 649 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Finally, I believe the Government has an important interest in 
leveling the electoral playing field by constraining the cost of federal campaigns.”). 
 49. This possibility does not seem very likely. Justices Ginsburg and Breyer have endorsed a version 
of the political equality rationale in the past. See Richard L. Hasen, Buckley is Dead: Long Live 
Buckley: The New Campaign Finance Incoherence of McConnell v. FEC, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31, 32 n.7 
(2004). Justice Sotomayor has not weighed in on the political equality rationale, but she served as a 
member of the New York City campaign finance board, and her writings seem generally supportive of 
campaign finance regulation. Kenneth P. Vogel, Sonya Sotomayor: No Empathy for Campaign Cash, 
POLITICO, May 28, 2009, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0509/23070.html. 
 50. After noting his earlier opinions accepting political equality rationales, Justice Stevens wrote in 
his Citizens United dissent: “I continue to adhere to these beliefs, but they have not been briefed by the 
parties or amici in this case, and their soundness is immaterial to its proper disposition.” Citizens United, 
130 S. Ct. at 963 n.65. 
 51. Sullivan, supra note 42, at 155. 
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antidistortion argument cannot be squared with this liberty-protecting 
reading. 
But the absence of a forthright defense of the antidistortion 
rationale from the Citizens United dissent imposes real social costs. 
In a recent article in the Minnesota Law Review,52 Justice Ginsburg 
explained the purposes served by dissenting opinions. Besides an “in-
house” function to turn a dissent into a majority opinion or to 
influence the writing of a majority opinion,53 dissents serve two key 
public purposes: “appeal[ing] . . . to the intelligence of a future 
day”54 and “attract[ing] immediate public attention and, thereby, 
[propelling] legislative change.”55 
Citizens United has been an unpopular decision in the public,56 and 
the source of that unpopularity seems to be tied to the public’s 
acceptance of antidistortion and political equality concerns. When 
President Obama railed against the decision, he spoke of corporations 
“drown[ing] out the voices of everyday Americans.”57 Similarly, 
when Senator Arlen Specter gave his farewell speech upon leaving 
the United States Senate, he condemned the opinion as “effectively 
undermining the basic democratic principle of the power of one 
person/one vote.”58 
Yet when campaign finance reform advocates embrace these 
rationales and propose legislative changes based upon them, they face 
                                                                                                                 
 52. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Role of Dissenting Opinions, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2010). 
 53. Justice Ginsburg notes the possibility that drafting a dissent will sway a majority, something she 
says happens no more than four times per term. Id. at 4. As noted above, I do not believe a dissent could 
have served this purpose in this case. Note also Chief Justice Roberts’s statement in his Citizens United 
concurrence: “We have also had the benefit of a comprehensive dissent that has helped ensure that the 
Court has considered all the relevant issues.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 925 (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring). 
 54. Ginsburg, supra note 52, at 4 (quoting former Chief Justice Hughes). 
 55. Id. at 6. 
 56. Hasen, supra note 7, at 620 n.258 (discussing public opinion polling on Citizens United). 
 57. Adam Liptak, Justices, 5-4, Reject Corporate Campaign Spending Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 
2010, at A1, available at 2010 WLNR 1385136 (“President Obama called [the decision] ‘a major 
victory for big oil, Wall Street banks, health insurance companies and the other powerful interests that 
marshal their power every day in Washington to drown out the voices of everyday Americans.’”). 
 58. Specter Delivers Closing Argument, CONG. DOC., Dec. 21, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 
25173103 (quoting Senator Specter). For a careful analysis of the basis of populist concern about the 
Citizens United decision, see Justin Levitt, Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29:1 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 217 (2010).  
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an uphill battle. A four-Justice dissent in Citizens United fully 
embracing the political equality rationale and offering a considered 
and careful analysis of the question,59 would have provided greater 
resonance for these rationales in the court of public opinion, and it 
would set the stage for eventual judicial acceptance of the rationale in 
the event that changes in Supreme Court personnel lead to a more 
receptive Court. 
Stripped of even a four-Justice endorsement and careful exposition 
of the political equality rationale, legal advocates with an eye on the 
courts are forced to discuss their legislative proposals and legal 
arguments for campaign finance regulations solely in other terms, 
such as anticorruption and shareholder protection. While these may 
also be valid rationales to sustain some campaign finance laws, 
promoting political equality is the real unspoken motivating force 
behind many legislative proposals to ameliorate the effects of 
Citizens United and to defend existing campaign finance laws against 
First Amendment challenge. Some advocates appear to speak in 
“don’t ask, don’t tell” mode, motivated by political equality concerns, 
but voicing their concerns as something else.60   
Aside from providing a public imprimatur of political equality as a 
key state interest to be balanced against First Amendment rights in 
campaign finance cases, a dissent expressly embracing the rationale 
could have provided greater clarity on thorny issues related to the 
political equality rationale, which would have benefitted legislators, 
the public, and eventually the courts.  
                                                                                                                 
 59. Justice Breyer, Cass Sunstein, Ned Foley and others have set out competing visions of political 
equality in the campaign finance context and how it may be reconciled with the First Amendment. See, 
e.g., Cass Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1390 (1994); 
Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 1204 (1994); STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION (2005). In setting out the rationale, a dissent would have benefitted from a cogent and 
thoughtful consideration of these sources or others. 
 60. Bruce Cain, Shade from the Glare: The Case for Semi-Disclosure, CATO UNBOUND, Nov. 8, 
2010, http://www.cato-unbound.org/2010/11/08/bruce-cain/shade-from-the-glare-the-case-for-semi-
disclosure/ (“[U]sing transparency as a weapon to combat inequality of voice is a dangerous game to 
play. It promotes forms of disclosure that are not narrowly tailored and invites closer Court scrutiny of 
disclosure laws.”). 
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Political equality is a broad term, and antidistortion is just one way 
of conceptualizing it. Recall that in Austin, the Court conceived of 
equality in terms of the ability of corporate spenders to persuade 
voters how to vote and said that large corporate spending could 
distort the outcome of elections.61 Similarly, in Caperton v. Massey, 
the Court held that a judge who benefitted from over $3 million in 
contributions to fund independent campaign spending on the judge’s 
behalf had to recuse himself from a case involving the contributor. 
The contributor’s hefty spending, making up the vast majority of the 
total spending supporting the judicial candidate in the election, had a 
“significant and disproportionate influence” on the candidate’s 
election.62 A variation on this antidistortion principle is that each 
speaker must have an equal opportunity to persuade, an idea that the 
Court in Austin appeared to reject.63   
These antidistortion arguments are premised on the idea that voters 
respond to the sheer amount of advertising for a candidate in an 
election. It is not clear though whether the “drowning out” idea is 
more about the wealthy buying up all the available advertising space 
on limited media such as television than it is about large spenders so 
inundating viewers with a message that viewers are persuaded to vote 
in a particular way, even if there is contrary advertising from 
others.64 
Other political equality arguments are premised less on the 
electoral results of unequal campaign spending and more on the 
legislative results. Independent spending favoring officeholders (or 
attacking their opponents) can help spenders curry favor with elected 
officials, and legislative actions therefore may be skewed toward the 
                                                                                                                 
 61. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658–60 (1990). 
 62. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2263–64 (2009). Justice Kennedy authored 
both majority opinions and was the only Justice in the majority in both cases. On the tensions between 
Justice Kennedy’s positions in Caperton and Citizens United, see Hasen, supra note 7, at 611–15. 
 63. “The Act does not attempt ‘to equalize the relative influence of speakers on elections,’ rather, it 
ensures that expenditures reflect actual public support for the political ideas espoused by corporations.” 
Austin, 494 U.S. at 660 (citations omitted). It was never clear to me that the Court here articulated a 
sensible distinction between the antidistortion argument it endorsed and the equality argument it 
purported to reject in this sentence. 
 64. The former argument is weaker than the latter to the extent that voters receive more information 
via sources with fewer limits on advertising, such as Internet web pages. 
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interests of the big spenders.65 This is a distortion of legislative rather 
than electoral outcomes. The constitutional case for this type of 
equality argument might be different than an argument premised on 
concern about distortion of electoral outcomes.  
Regardless of which type of political equality argument should be 
pursued, it will be important to articulate precisely how far the 
relevant equality principle can go consistent with protection of 
freedom of speech and association. As Richard Briffault explains: 
It is not possible to truly equalize influence over elections. 
Indeed, given the value of robust and uninhibited political 
participation and the extensive regulation it would take to assure 
total equality, assuring absolutely equal influence over elections 
is not even desirable. Nevertheless, dramatically unequal 
campaign spending that reflects underlying inequalities of wealth 
is in sharp tension with the one person, one vote principle 
enshrined in our civic culture and our constitutional law.66 
How should the balance be struck? The specter of bureaucratic 
book-banning and Internet censoring figured heavily into the rhetoric 
of the Citizens United majority opinion, as did federal law’s 
exceptionalism for media corporations. On top of these concerns are 
ones about campaign finance legislation, if passed by a legislature 
rather than through a voter initiative, that can serve to protect 
incumbents from political competition. These are weighty concerns, 
which should not be dismissed lightly by those believing political 
equality may serve as a compelling interest to justify campaign 
finance regulation. 
Justice Breyer has given great thought to the intersection of the 
First Amendment and equality principles and argues for a careful 
balancing of rights and interests in this context, recognizing First 
                                                                                                                 
 65. I have long advocated this view of political equality in my writing on campaign finance. See, 
e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of 
Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1996). 
 66. Richard Briffault, Public Funding and Democratic Elections, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 563, 577–78 
(1999). 
16
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 4
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol27/iss4/4
2011] ORPHANED ANTIDISTORION RATIONALE  
 
1005 
Amendment concerns on both sides of the controversy.67 Under his 
“participatory self-government” variant of the political equality 
rationale, courts would closely scrutinize laws passed in the name of 
political equality, ensuring that the laws were not passed as 
incumbency protection measures and that there is robust political 
competition.68 But Justice Breyer’s ideas need further thinking going 
forward, as the Internet affects both the cost of campaign advertising 
and its effects on the electorate and as the public now experiences 
elections without corporate (and labor union) spending limits. 
Resolution of all of these difficult, subsidiary questions, however, 
will have to wait for a day far in the future, in part because of the 
abandonment of the antidistortion rationale by the dissenters in 
Citizens United. It could well be another generation before the Court 
approaches these issues again, and at that point there will be some 
serious intellectual work ahead. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 67. See Breyer, supra note 59. 
 68. I describe the rationale in Hasen, supra note 49. 
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